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INTRODUCTION
For the better part of two decades, feminists have been questioning the
usefulness of the law in advancing gender justice.1 Early feminist struggles,
particularly those of what is commonly understood as second-wave
feminism, focused on achieving formal equality and giving teeth to
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.2 The big cases are easily
recognizable landmark changes to constitutional law.3 Common law has
received comparatively less attention as a source of and, indeed, as a locus
of gender justice. Professor Anita Bernstein’s book The Common Law Inside
the Female Body makes a powerful argument that we need to consider. The
common law is often derogatorily dismissed as “judge-made law” in the
United States, possibly because we have come to believe (erroneously) that
the province of lawmaking is that of the legislature alone and that judges
ought to stick to interpreting and applying that which is legislated or
*
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See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 5 (1989).
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See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (finding exclusion of women from a state
educational institution a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (decriminalizing abortion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (finding preference
for male executors of estates a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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recognized clearly as common law precedent. This is likely a peculiarity of
the American legal tradition with its preoccupation with separation of powers
and constitutional law. Yet the common law has never been simply about
following precedent.4 Lawyers trained in the United States have to make their
peace with the fact that this judicial lawmaking tradition is foundational to
our legal system whether we believe unelected (and elected) judges are
capable of doing so well or not.
Many feminists have written off the common law because, as Bernstein
acknowledges, it is slow moving and tends to be conservative.5 It does not
yield the kind of dramatic outcomes and reversals of precedent that federal
or state constitutional cases do. Nevertheless, at the heart of it, the common
law protects vital negative liberties which prevent the state from intruding
into the lives of women. A negative right merely prevents states from
obstructing citizens from their pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. And
these liberties, or as Bernstein puts it, “Do Not Wants,” are of critical
importance to women.6
I found compelling Bernstein’s description of the common law as a tool
for feminist reform. Her argument that the common law gives women as
much right to say no as men is important. However, there are weaknesses in
the common law that make it less than ideal for feminist law reform.
Bernstein acknowledges these and so the following observations are less
criticisms of her work than they are attempts to focus in on some of the
difficulties Bernstein raises in her book.
In this Essay, I focus on three specific points. First, I examine the scope
of the common law’s protection to underscore the point that this protection
is not uniformly available. It is predicated on legal personhood and by
4
A number of scholars have written about judicial lawmaking. Some of the classics in the field are
Wolfgang Friedman, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29 MOD. L. REV. 593
(1966); Jack G. Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE WESTERN RES. L. Rev. 563 (1976); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1 (1985); see also Arthur
Eisenberg, Dear Brett Kavanaugh, Justices Do Make Law, AM. C.L. UNION (July 13, 2018, 1:15 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/dear-brett-kavanaugh-justices-do-make-law
[https://perma.cc/S36D-GW78].
5
BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1.
6
Id. at 75.

Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative liberty to
the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense. Positive liberty is the possibility
of acting — or the fact of acting — in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s
fundamental purposes. While negative liberty is usually attributed to individual agents, positive
liberty is sometimes attributed to collectivities, or to individuals considered primarily as members
of given collectivities.
Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 2,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative [https://perma.cc/AZ9A-V6CK].
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bracketing that threshold requirement, many people, mostly minorities, are
left without recourse to the law. Second, I take up the uses and limits of
property as an analogy to women’s bodies. I argue that property law is far
less helpful when the violator is the state as opposed to a private actor.
Finally, I suggest that there are important linkages that require further
inquiry. Economic changes and imperialism had indelible effects on the
common law. Thus, a purely legal examination of the United States’
experience with the common law misses how capitalism and imperialism
shaped its ideas about property, family, and personhood.
I.

THE SCOPE OF THE COMMON LAW’S PROTECTION

First, there is the threshold question of whom the law protects. For
much of history, the common law has acknowledged the existence of
different kinds of legal persons (from the time of feudalism and serfs,
villeins, and other bonded people to gender distinctions in the modern
period).7 In order to make the case that the common law now protects
women, we have to make the same accommodation that Bernstein makes
regarding legal personhood—we have to bracket out much of common law
history and confine ourselves to the last two centuries.8 As Bernstein tells us,
judge-made law cannot confer legal statuses and the rights that attach. It can
only vindicate the rights of those who already possess both.9 This means that
we must look to statutory laws to confer this recognition on both men and
women who have historically been excluded from the group of those who
had rights.10
The common law did not summarily exclude all women from
protection. However, we know that it recognized an unequal status and
maintained gender distinctions.11 For example, in the United States, enslaved
people were entirely excluded, and the common law could not free them.
Thus, who could avail themselves of the negative liberties historically

7
Legal Personhood denotes an entity that carries the legal rights and duties of a subject in the law.
A legal person may not always be a “natural person.” For example, corporations are considered legal
persons. In this Essay, I point out that even before a natural person may appear before the law to vindicate
their rights, they must be “seen” as a legal person having rights and being able to do so. For an introduction
to the concept, see Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Persons and Personhood, LEGAL THEORY
BLOG (Dec. 31, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/12/legal-theory-lexiconpersons-and-personhood.html [https://perma.cc/3JF2-KWR5].
8
BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 15–21.
9
Id. at 24–27.
10
Presumably, villeins, serfs, and other forms of bonded labor were not created by statute in the
Middle Ages. Therefore, these statuses must arise from “something else” which forms the basis upon
which the common law affords them recognition and legality. See id.
11
Id. at 24–28.
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protected by the common law? Those who were already viewed as fully
human, fully legal persons, even if gender made them unequal.
The potential for equality exists only where legal persons do.
Blackstone’s remarkable observation that “this spirit of liberty is so deeply
implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave
or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the
laws, [] and with regard to all natural rights becomes eo instanti [from that
instant] a freeman”12 was made true not by the common law but by the
abolition of slavery through legislative act.13 In the United States, one might
point out that not all Blacks were slaves. Did the common law protect with
equal fervor the rights of free black men? At a time when freemen were
constantly fearful of being enslaved regardless of their status, one would
think not.
Neither legislation nor the common law were able to fully protect the
free status of African descended peoples. In other words, the common law
judges were able to justify withholding the protections of the law from
people who were legal persons by simply refusing to give credence to the
evidence they were free. So, while being unable to confer legal personhood,
they were willing and able to aid in depriving free Blacks of that status
through contract and property law.14
The inability of the common law to confer equal status is a serious
weakness, and for feminists, this undermines the usefulness of the common
law in substantively achieving the equality promised by formal laws.
Legislative supremacy, therefore, obviously channels efforts at reform in that
direction. Nevertheless, Bernstein’s point that the common law is not
necessarily antagonistic to women’s rights does raise questions of
possibilities and strategies that feminists would do well to consider.15

12

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 86 (Oxford 2016) (alteration in original).
The Act of 1807 abolished the slave trade in Great Britain. However, slavery continued in the
colonies until 1833 and Britain continued to have ties to the trade for decades following the Act. See, e.g.,
MARIKA SHERWOOD, AFTER ABOLITION: BRITAIN AND THE SLAVE TRADE SINCE 1807 (2007).
14
See Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 105, 124–30 (Jean
Allain ed., 2012). While Finkleman agrees with Bernstein that the common law cannot be read to condone
or promote slavery, he also notes that it was used to give effect to contracts and property rights concerning
slaves. Also, note the now widely known story of Solomon Northrup who was captured and enslaved for
twelve years even though he was a free man. The story became the basis of the Oscar-winning film, 12
Years a Slave, the title taken from Northrup’s autobiography written in 1853.
15
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1–2. Indeed, feminists would do well to use the argument made
by Bernstein that now that women are considered formally equal, the common law’s protections once
afforded to men are equally afforded to women. Thus, any argument based on tradition, which is so often
relied on in substantive due process litigation, can be at least partially refuted as the gender unequal
portion of tradition should no longer apply.
13

163

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

II. PROPERTY LAW AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
Bernstein’s reliance on property law in the argument that women have
the right to exclude people from their bodies is both attractive and
problematic. Its attractions are clearly articulated. To perhaps oversimplify
her argument, she claims that if the common law acknowledges the right to
exclude intruders from property with force, even deadly force, then surely
such force is acceptable against any who intrude into the body of a selfpossessing woman.16 This argument is easily understood when it comes to
repelling sexual assault, but is likely less palatable to some when applied to
abortion. The body as property, the self-possessing individual, and the
liberties that attach have long been subjects of philosophical and legal
inquiry.17 The actions in defense of self and property that will be condoned
depend on who is doing the boundary-crossing.
Property and the law’s singular regard for it is not as firm a ground
when the state is involved, as when the boundary crosser is a private actor.18
We may tend to think otherwise because much of our constitutional law,
when it comes to personal rights, is about negative liberties asserted against
the state. For instance, historically, in common law-abiding England, there
was very little by way of entirely “private property.”19 Land was held largely
by the Crown (even now the state is the largest landowner). Fee simple
absolute was rare. Americans largely abandoned the byzantine feudal
property titles preferring outright ownership.20 But title is only as good as the
state’s willingness to recognize it and uphold it. Moreover, as we have seen,
even if the law theoretically regards property rights as sacred, the state
crosses boundaries and invades it with some frequency. Feminists have had
to draw careful lines around private property, demanding that the state
protect women from violence even in the inner sanctum of the marital
bedchamber.21 They have tried to both argue for privacy and also dismantle
the public/private divide depending on context. For instance, the state has
adopted some of these feminist arguments against privacy to prevent
domestic violence and to ensure the wellbeing of children. And it has also
16

See id. at 115.
See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, OUR BODIES, WHOSE PROPERTY? 45–49, 135–137 (2013) (discussing
Locke and Rousseau’s conception of property and individual rights to liberty and arguing that they did
not consider women to be included in the category of rights holders).
18
See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 44–71 (1997).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See e.g., JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) (arguing that domestic violence law long advocated for by feminists has
eroded privacy in the home, traditionally protected by the common law castle doctrine).
17
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ignored feminist arguments for privacy to monitor the activities of those
receiving state assistance.22
The point here is that while one might be able to repel the intrusions of
a private individual as a trespasser, one may not be able to repel the state.
And increasingly, we are seeing intrusions into the bodies of individuals
from transvaginal ultrasound legislation to the state’s ability to conduct
cavity searches and to draw blood from those suspected of driving under the
influence.23 Of course, these invasions are justified by (statutory) exceptions.
Nevertheless, the number and scope of exceptions seem to be expanding to
the point of whittling away the firm ground of the right to exclude.
Rape is the easier case in the book. It is a criminal offense and the
trespass by a private violator is easily recognizable as long as consent is
absent.24 And consent is the terrain on which battles about rape law are being
fought.25 But abortion and intrusions by the state are another matter entirely.
III. HISTORICIZING THE COMMON LAW: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND
EMPIRE AS INFLUENCES OF CHANGE
On a different note, Bernstein’s book raised my curiosity about the
effect of economic change on the development of the common law. Some of
the changes in property law and many changes in the structure of the family
coincide with the rise of capitalism and the advent of Liberalism.26 Enclosure
and the changing of public land into private land, the rise of the “rights
bearing” individual and social contract theory, and the formation of the
private nuclear family with a status separate from the market/public perhaps
coincide with the evolution of negative liberty. Further elaboration on how
these rights evolved with the inclusion of the economic drivers would be of
interest.
Recent historical work on women slaveholders, for instance, suggests
that coverture did not prevent married women from owning and managing

22

Id.
The most recent Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 U.S. 2525 (2019), upholds
a Wisconsin law that holds an unconscious motorist has given tacit consent to blood drawing by the
police, who can then ascertain if the driver is under the influence. It is of interest to note the assertion that
someone who is unconscious has given consent is common in sexual assault cases.
24
Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 446 (2016).
25
Id.; see also Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual
Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183 (2016).
26
I capitalize Liberalism here to denote the political and philosophical school of thought that
emerged during the Enlightenment as opposed to the political distinctions made in U.S. electoral politics.
See
e.g.,
Liberalism,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.
(Jan.
22,
2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism [https://perma.cc/E3ZC-EJLM].
23
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their own slaves without spousal interference.27 Married and single women
managed and disciplined their slaves as private property, and actively
participated in the slave trade.28 Families used trusts, prenuptial agreements,
and other means to evade coverture even before the statutory enactment of
married women’s property rights.29 Married women sued in chancery (even
though in the United States, the distinction between law and equity has been
blurred) for separation of property to make clear what property could not be
reached by a husband’s creditors.30
I raise this to suggest that it would be interesting to trace the
development of the common law by taking into account the economic
changes of the day and the ways in which some women’s lived experiences
did not coincide with the legal constraints to which they were formally
subject. Feminists have become increasingly interested in the economic
dimensions of law reform, which suggests future historical work to be done
in this area.31
Relatedly, Bernstein starts her book with the intriguing statement that
the “canvas is wider than one wide country.”32 Certainly, the history of the
common law in England and the United States has relevance to other
Commonwealth countries that share a legal heritage.33 This book, however,
does not (and perhaps cannot) draw those linkages. But those linkages are
important. For instance, Brenna Bhandar’s work on colonial property
demonstrates that, in fact, changes in colonial property regimes were often
imported back into Britain and changed the law.34 An example of this is
formal titling of property, which was not required in England but became
prevalent (sometimes dispossessing those who could not show ownership)
after it was introduced in the colonies.35 Bhandar notes that common law
property protections based on possession gave way to greater protection for
27
See generally STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS
SLAVE OWNERS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 29–30, 57–80 (2019).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies
and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010) (examining
the distinction between market and family and theorizing the “economic family”). For an early
exploration of the link between market and family in U.S. legal scholarship, see Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
32
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 2.
33
Commonwealth
Countries:
Commonwealth,
INST.
ADVANCED
LEGAL
STUD.,
https://libguides.ials.sas.ac.uk/commonwealth [https://perma.cc/Z9DP-HL69].
34
BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF PROPERTY: LAW, LAND, AND RACIAL REGIMES OF
OWNERSHIP 82 (2018).
35
Id.
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formal title holders’ rights.36 Developments such as these have less to do with
legal personhood or misreadings and misapplications of the law than they do
with change driven by factors exogenous to the law.37
Bhandar’s project is to excavate the co-construction of property laws
and ownership and colonial/racial subjects. She asserts:
Thus not only was property law the primary means of appropriating land and
resources, but property ownership was central to the formation of the proper
legal subject in the political sphere. Analyzing the techniques of ownership that
remain a primary mode of dispossession in settler colonies cuts across the
economic, cultural, political, and psychic sphere of colonial and postcolonial
life. Modernity ushered in a relationship between ownership and subjectivity,
wherein the latter was defined through and on the basis of one’s capacity to
appropriate.38

This observation is in line with Bernstein’s own project of showing how
women came to be possessors and asserters of property rights through the
expansion of recognition that they were legal persons. Bhandar’s further
claim, expanding on Frantz Fanon’s theoretical work on (de)colonization,
however, is that for racial minorities and colonial subjects, it is the very
introduction of common law property that dispossesses them and, indeed,
helps create the differential category.39 And here, taking together this insight
and that of Jones-Rogers, we come to the problem of whether the common
law is racist and sexist because of the way it has developed and the contexts
in which it has developed. Or has it been, as Bernstein argues, simply
misapplied and misinterpreted by judges enacting their own biases.40 If the
latter, I worry that we fall into the Plessy trap in recognizing form over
substance rather than something deeper and structural:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.41

Or to paraphrase it: If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the common law, but solely because judges choose to put that construction
upon it.
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 25–27.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
Historicizing property law and the role of capitalism and Liberalism in
its present formation helps to show that the direction of change in the
common law, though slow moving, is not natural or predetermined. It is
contingent on political and economic contexts and developments including
the experience of slavery and colonialism. As such, the arguments that are
available in the future may be shaped by other contextual changes—judges
making judge-made law are, after all, people of their times. This is not a
misreading of the common law as much as the inevitable result of its
structure. One aspect of feminist theorizing then, is to imagine what these
alternative futures might be. Bernstein’s work is important in
unapologetically asserting what rights we have and in justifying and
undergirding legal arguments to protect those rights. Her meticulously
researched book should revive feminists’ interest in the common law as a
basis for challenging the erosion of women’s liberties. As part of our legal
history, the arguments presented in the book are valuable in contesting what
many judges and anti-feminists consider long standing tradition. Bernstein
powerfully shows that now that women are (legal) individuals, we can
demand the same negative liberties that have been and continue to be integral
to our society. And as women increasingly become part of the judiciary, we
may also be so bold as to try and shape the future direction that judge-made
law takes as well.
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